Reforming the Strasbourg Doctrine on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Context of Environmental Protection by Heiskanen, Heta-Elena & Viljanen, Jukka
  
 
This document has been downloaded from  
TamPub – The Institutional Repository of University of Tampere 
 
 
Publisher's version 
 
The permanent address of the publication is 
http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:uta-201504171280 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Author(s):   Heiskanen, Heta-Elena; Viljanen, Jukka 
Title:  Reforming the Strasbourg Doctrine on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction in the Context of Environmental Protection 
Year:   2014 
Journal Title:   European Law Reporter 
Pages:   285-295 
Publisher:   Verlag Radical Brain 
Extent:   285-295 
ISSN:   1028-9690 
Discipline:   Law 
School /Other Unit:  School of Management 
Item Type:   Journal Article 
Language:   en 
URN:   URN:NBN:fi:uta-201504171280 
Subject:  ympäristö; Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuin; 
ekstraterritoriaalisuus; environment; European Court of 
Human Rights; extraterritoriality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All material supplied via TamPub is protected by copyright and other intellectual 
property rights, and duplication or sale of all part of any of the repository collections 
is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use 
or educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain permission for 
any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or 
otherwise to anyone who is not an authorized user. 
 
285
no  11
European Law Reporter
This paper suggests that the post-Bankovic doc -
trinal development of extraterritoriality has rele-
vance for future cases before the European Court
of Human Rights, also within new contexts, such
as the environment. The paper summarises the
current doctrine and proposes a revised version of
it. In particular, a model for future applications of
extraterritorial responsibility is illustrated in the
environmental context.
(1) Introduction
The doctrines of coherent and consistent inter -
pretation are inherent to the authoritative status
of the Strasbourg case-law. The criteria of co -
herence and consistency do not mean that the
doctrines neither develop nor have future po -
tentials which could refine the established inter-
pretation of the European Convention on
Human Rights (the «Convention» or «ECHR»).
However, these doctrines have to be considered 
in light of the general rules of inter pretation of 
international law and in the context of human
rights law, thus the emphasis should be placed on
the object and purpose of the treaty in question.1
One of the key aspects for the correct interpreta-
tion of the Convention is therefore to take into ac-
count its purpose of protecting rights and free-
doms of individuals and the Convention’s general
spirit.2
Article 1 of the Convention provides that «[t]he
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in Section I of this Convention». This does
not absolve the Contracting Parties from their
 responsibility for the consequences happening
outside their territorial jurisdiction. This principle
was confirmed in a number of extradition and ex-
pulsion cases (e.g. Soering3 and Chahal4). There,
an interesting doctrinal construction of
extraterritorial jurisdiction has been devel-
oped,5 i.e. the responsibility of the Contracting
Parties could be extended beyond territorial 
jurisdiction when certain con ditions are fulfilled.
One of the essential elements behind the
extra–territorial doctrine was that treaty pro -
visions were not designed to enable the Con -
tracting States to evade their responsibility while
human rights violations were clearly happening
under their control.
Inherent to the development of the case-law of
the European Court of Human Rights
(«ECtHR») has been referring to the established
case continuums for further interpretation. The
general extra territoriality doctrine does not pro-
vide an ex ception to this. Currently, the responsi-
bility of the Contracting Parties for human rights
violations happening outside their own territory
can be invoked in exceptional circumstances, be-
cause of acts of their authorities, whether per-
formed  within or outside national boundaries.6 
The contemporary human rights discourse has ap-
proached the jurisdiction doctrine with consistent,
but cautious evolution.7 The Bankovic decision
 determined rather strict criteria for the establish-
ment of the extraterritorial responsibility of the
Contracting Parties. The Court approached the
concept of jurisdiction by adopting its ordinary
meaning rather than interpretation in light of ob-
ject and purpose of the Convention. In particular,
in keeping with the essentially territorial notion of
jurisdiction, the Court has held that acts of the
Contracting States performed, or producing
 effects, outside their territories can constitute an
exercise of jurisdiction by them within the
 meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, when the
State, through the effective control of the relevant
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a con -
sequence of military occupation or through the
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Govern-
ment of that territory, exercises all or some of the
public powers normally to be exercised by that
Government. It added that the extra-territorial
 exercise of jurisdiction by a State include cases
 involving the activities of its diplomatic or consular
agents abroad and on board craft and vessels
 registered in, or flying the flag of, that State.8 This
jurisprudence has subsequently been reinvented
and many scholars are describing the current in-
terpretation as the post-Bankovic era in the
extraterritoriality continuum.9 This evolution re-
lates to policy considerations that are particularly
important when it comes to grave human rights
violations. Rigid treaty interpretation can in fact
undermine the role of international human rights
institutions.10 Before the ECtHR, the application of
the extraterritorial argumentation was limited to
specific contexts of grave violations of Articles 2
and 3 of the Convention in order to protect these
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absolute rights in cases of military operations, 
extraditions and expulsions.11 Nevertheless, schol-
ars like Karen Da Costa have observed that, 
although the ECtHR continues to consider that the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction may apply
under  Article 1 of the Convention only in excep-
tional  circumstances, it has increasingly found this
to occur.12 One of the key considerations sup -
porting such extended accountability relates back
to the object and purpose of the Convention.13
This paper suggests that the doctrinal devel -
opment on extraterritoriality has relevance for
future cases in new contexts, for example,
in the context of environmental law. This paper
analyses every aspect of the general extraterri -
toriality doctrine. Firstly it discusses the key criteria
of extraterritoriality, namely the definition of State
actors, exceptional circumstances, effective con-
trol and territorial linkage. In addition, the paper
analyses how the nature of rights impacts on 
the establishment of extraterritorial State respon -
sibility. The paper further suggests that the level 
of intention of the State in question influences the
threshold in applying the extraterritoriality criteria.
More generally, the paper summarises the cur-
rent doctrine, proposes a revised version
of it and illustrates a model of future application
in the environmental context. 
(2) Reconstruction of the extraterritorial
doctrine in the environmental context 
(a) A change in the traditional notion of State
 actors
The ECtHR has traditionally spoken of States as
 actors exercising authority and control over indi-
viduals through their agents. This has been a
 crucial element for the application of extrater -
ritorial jurisdiction and the responsibility of the
State for human rights obligations. In Al  Skeini
and others, the Court confirmed the test in its cur-
rent form, by stating: «It is clear that, whenever
the State, through its agents, exercises control and
authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction,
the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to
secure to that individual the rights and freedoms
under Section I of the Convention that are rele-
vant to the situation of that individual. In this
sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be
«divided and tailored»».14
The first condition for the extraterritorial appli -
cation of rights is therefore that the acts are
 committed by State authorities. This notion en -
compasses: (a) acts of diplomatic and consular
agents, (b) the exercise of authority and control
(including judicial or executive functions) over
 foreign territory by individuals, if the third State
 allows it through consent, invitation or acquies-
cence and (c) the use of force by State agents
 operating outside the territory of the State.15
The contexts in which this criterion has been de-
fined are primarily related to military ac-
tions. One specific legal question concerns the
use of private contractors. The ECtHR recog-
nised in Ilascu, the responsibility of a State even in
the case of private groups operating under its con-
sent or acquiescence.16 The ECtHR also confirmed
that «[a] State may also be held responsible even
where its agents are acting ultra vires or  contrary
to instructions. Under the Convention, a State’s
authorities are strictly liable for the conduct of
their subordinates; they are under a duty to
 impose their will and cannot shelter behind their
inability to ensure that it is respected».17 The
ECtHR restated the existence of State’s responsi-
bility for ill-treatment administered by private in -
dividuals also in the context of Article 3 rights.18
This kind of extended approach to those re -
sponsible for human rights violations can provide
options for a more flexible interpretation also in
other contexts of law. In relation to extraterri -
toriality, the responsibility to control pri-
vate corporations has been discussed in rela-
tion to military actions. Carsten Hoppe has
observed in this respect that the use of positive
human rights law obligations in conjunction with
humanitarian law, may potentially fulfill the
 «regulatory gap» in the context of the ECHR in
order to comply with the «duty to prevent» doc-
trine.19 Hoppe has concluded, with some limi -
tations, that: «Where applicable, the ECHR, under
Articles 2 and 3, may establish a duty on hiring
states to plan any security operation which risks
threatening the right to life, where they hire the
third party, even if the risk stems from uncon-
trolled or off-duty conduct of contractors’ person-
nel involved in such operations».20
An analogy between the use of private contrac-
tors and privatisation of other services can be the-
oretically built as follows. The State has duty to
control private contractors in military context.
Likewise, the ECtHR has established that States
have obligations to control acts of private parties
in relation to activities causing environmental
risks.21 In the landmark case Lopez Ostra K Spain,
the ECtHR established for the first time in the en-
vironmental context that the failure of a State to
control industrial activities gives rise to State re-
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sponsibility under Article 8 ECHR.22 The ECtHR has
further ruled, for example in Moreno Gomez K
Spain23 and Mileva K Bulgaria,24 that passive re -
actions to complaints concerning clubs’ and of-
fices’ noise nuisance constitute a basis for State
responsibility.  
Öneryildiz K Turkey started a new continuum
under Article 2 ECHR by emphasising that a duty
to prevent environmental disasters could be
identified, when expert reports predict the high
probability of such harm.25 The ECHR intends to
place effective deterrence to threats to the right to
life. Accordingly, it sets up certain elements that
are relevant in relation to dangerous activities. The
authorities are held accountable for the licensing,
setting up, operation, security and supervision of
such activities.26 This development continued in
Budayeva K Russia where an environmental
 disaster such as mudslide gave rise to State re-
sponsibility, as the authorities were aware of the
risk and failed not only to take sufficient pre -
ventive measures, but also to conduct a thorough
investigation after the disaster.27 Such circum-
stances involving total passivity on the national
authorities’ side, may also involve a shift in the
burden of proof. For example in Akvidar and
 others K Turkey, where the State failed to under-
take investigations and to offer assistance, it be-
came incumbent on the respondent Government
to show what it had done in response to the scale
and seriousness of the reported matters.28
Whilst in the environmental jurisprudence of the
ECtHR it is not required that the State hired the
corporation, in order to qualify the latter as a State
agency for the purpose of extraterritorial State re-
sponsibility, the general development introduced
by Hoppe has focused more on the fulfilment of
formal requirements.29 Thus it is expected that
the ECtHR would be reluctant to accept
loose linkage between the corporation and the
State in order to establish the responsibility of the
latter when the actions are taking place outside its
own borders. However, on the basis of the current
case-law, if the act committed by private actors
causing trans-boundary pollution occurs in the
State’s own territory, State liability is easier to es-
tablish.
(b) Revising the exceptional circumstances termi-
nology
The ECtHR has to be convinced that exceptional
circumstances exist for it to conclude for the es-
tablishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction under
Article 1 of the Convention. In essence, the excep-
tional circumstances terminology refers to a nar-
row list of well-established circumstances that
constitute acceptable exceptions.30 For example in
Al-Skeini and Others K United Kingdom31 the
ECHR found that the exceptional circumstances
criterion was satisfied due to the United King-
dom’s assumption of authority for the mainte-
nance of security in the area.
However, there are clear indications from the re-
cent domestic law and practice, such as the UK
Supreme Court’s judgment in Smith (and others)
K MOD,32 that there is rising awareness that the
exceptionality criterion has been interpreted
too strictly, while it should not only refer to
 restricted circumstances. An overly broad interpre-
tation of the notion may however have serious im-
plications, bringing for example to the establish-
ment of a State’s responsibility merely on the basis
of its prior knowledge of the risks of the situation
and its subsequent negligence. In order to expand
the notion of exceptionality, yet within acceptable
limits, reference could be made to issues such as
the widespread impact, length and knowledge of
the violations by the State.
In addition, the Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda K United
Kingdom cases illustrate how exceptional circum-
stances33 may shift the interpretation from the
cautious and formal Bankovic era into an orientat-
ed approach in light of the object and purpose of
Article 1 of the Convention.34 Bearing in mind the
traditional interpretative principles referring to the
use of the ordinary meaning of the terms, the ob-
ject and purpose of the Article and the context in
which the provision can be found,35 the ECtHR
shall also take into consideration «any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which es-
tablishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation».36 These two competing princi-
ples of interpretation are central to the further de-
velopment of the concept of exceptional circum-
stances. While following precedents may help the
States to predict the ECtHR’s judgments, the pro-
gressive and living interpretation of the Con -
vention inherently requires the ECtHR to analyse,
what are its object and purpose are in light of
present conditions.
Smith and others K MOD37 is an example of the in-
terpretation according to which the exceptionality
criterion should not be limited to restricted cir-
cumstances. There is no particular obstacle, other
than the lack of a precedent, to expand the notion
of exceptional circumstances to cover also certain
serious cross-border environmental problems, es-
pecially when the State is aware of the harm that
will probably take place as a result of certain eco-
2 0 1 4  
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nomic activities.38 It is not unreasonable to con-
clude therefore that the exceptional circum-
stances criteria could be met in environmental ex-
traterritorial cases, thus being within the scope of
the object and purpose of the Convention.
In this sense, it is interesting to note what Human
Rights Watch and Minority Rights Group Inter -
national, interveners in Chagos Islanders, have
stated: «The drafters of the Convention had never
in tended that States should not be responsible for
their extraterritorial actions. It would be uncon-
scionable to permit States to commit acts overseas
which they could not perpetrate on their home
territory, whether within or outside the regional
space of the Council of Europe. Article 1 should be
interpreted in line with jurisdiction provisions of
other international human rights instruments».39
It is in fact inherent to the interpretation in light of
object and purpose of the Convention as
a human rights treaty to provide effective pro -
tection to the rights of individuals. In the field of
environmental protection, this effectiveness prin-
ciple obviously requires that infringements 
of environmental human rights are not
transferred to countries, where the environ-
mental human rights standards are lower in order
to prevent a circumvention of treaty obligations.
Similarly other types of mechanisms intended to
circumvent human rights obligations could be
considered incompatible with the object and pur-
pose of the Convention. An analogous situation
could be constructed in the context of positive ob-
ligations to supervise private corporations in the
environmental context, when such supervision is
limited to those operating within the national bor-
ders, but those operating abroad. This kind of ex-
pansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is in-line
with the general approach that no double stan-
dards should apply to the Contracting Parties.40
(c) The non-centrality of the place where the
violation occurs
The extraterritorial obligations may be performed
within or outside national boundaries. Early Ar -
ticle 3 ECHR cases concerning extraterritorial en-
gagement, such as Soering K United Kingdom41
and Vilvarajah K United Kingdom,42 have so far
been related to situations where the applicant is
not yet outside the State territory. As maintained
by the ECtHR in Bankovic, «liability is incurred in
such cases by an action of the respondent State
concerning a person while he or she is on its terri-
tory, clearly within its jurisdiction, and that such
cases do not concern the actual exercise of a
State’s competence or jurisdiction abroad».43
The trend of widening the territorial
 application of the Convention has appeared in
cases such as Sanchez Ramirez K France and
Öcalan K Turkey concerning the capture of
known terrorists outside European borders.44 The
development with respect to previous expulsion
cases can be particularly noted in Hirsi Jamaa
where the ECtHR established the engagement of
State responsibility despite the fact that the ac-
tions happened outside the State’s territory and 
in international waters.45 This case is highly signif-
icant, because it concluded for the existence of a
State responsibility for collective expulsions rather
than merely consider the application of treaty ob-
ligations solely in light of the individual applicant’s
circumstances.
Also in the environmental context, extraterritorial
harm may be found within or outside national
borders. For instance, acts falling within national
borders may include chemical catastrophes in
areas that are close to another State or floods
caused by the failure to sufficiently control and
maintain the efficient functioning of dams. It
should be noted that failures to regulate and
 control the acts of private parties in situations
 involving extraterritorial environmental impact
would also constitute in-State action.
The extraordinary rendition cases have recently
provided several supporting arguments that could
have interesting possibilities for requiring taking
appropriate measures and remanding assurances
even when the applicant has left the State’s terri-
tory. In Al-Nashiri K Poland, the ECtHR recalled
that it could require the State concerned to «take
all possible steps to obtain the appropriate diplo-
matic assurances from the destination State.
Those representations may be required even if an
applicant has already been transferred from the
territory of the respondent State, but the risk [of
being subjected to ill-treatment or of the death
penalty being imposed on him] still continues».46
More generally, a State’s responsibility may be
 engaged when the authorities failed to take
 reasonable steps to avoid a risk of ill-
treatment of which they knew or of which they
ought to have known.47
In the environmental context, the conclusions es-
tablished in Hirsi Jamaa and other cases in the
same continuum could be developed further in 
relation to both environmental refugees and 
the transferal of heavy polluting industries. Knox
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has introduced scenarios concerning pollution,
namely toxic dumping, that includes circumven-
tion of treaty obligations leading to violations of
the right to life, food and health, safety and health
in the working environment, etc.48 Likewise, the
State could be held responsible for not having
 required due assurances, even though the actual
responsibility of the operation has been trans-
ferred to a State that is not a party to the Con -
vention or even to private corporations  working
outside of the jurisdiction of the State in question.
(d) The application of the effective control criteria
in non-military contexts
The effective control concept currently
refers to two alternative situations: the effective
control of a State agent over a person49 or al-
ternatively over an area.50 Examples of the first
group include acts of diplomats and consular
agents over persons, or exercising physical control
through detention or similar actions. Executive or
judicial functions within the meaning of inter -
national law also fulfil such criteria. In the legal
discourse, the two concepts are sometimes di -
vided into effective authority (authority and con-
trol) and effective control.51
On the other hand, effective control over an area
refers primarily to lawful or unlawful
 military actions. The basic situation is a State
occupation, such as, for instance, to what
 happened in Cyprus.52 However some scholars,
such as Michal Gondek, have contended that
 Ilascu amended and expanded the effective con-
trol  concept from the mere military context to a
 separatist regime in another State with the
 political, military, and economic support of
 another.53 This development serves as a basis for
discussion on whether a corporation, holding a
major impact on the local area, can be seen as a
comparable situation.
Transnational corporations may in fact have a
great influence in a geographic area. When na -
tural resources are located outside the country of
registration, corporations may exercise de facto
extraterritorial powers. The positive obligations’
doctrine requires, in certain circumstances, that
States closely scrutinise actions undertaken by in-
dividuals and private organisations and consider
whether these are compatible with human rights
obligations. Thus it could be concluded that the
general doctrines of extraterritoriality could apply,
despite the fact that the actions are not State
 actions in the traditional sense.
Cases such as Sanchez Ramirez K France and
Öcalan K Turkey concerning the capture of
known terrorists outside European borders have
established that the authorities are under the obli-
gation to ensure the rights of the individual, when
a person is under the control of security forces.54
While the jurisprudence has established States’
control in regard to asylum seekers, prisons or
ships, there are no legal restrains to interpret that
the exclusive control over a factory, could also
qualify for the purposes of the concept.
(e) Intention or prior knowledge lowering the
threshold for extraterritorial liability
The established jurisprudence on extraterritoriality
sets requirements for a State to act with special
care. States may infringe the Convention whether
they are ignorant of the facts or consciously
breach their obligations. In recent judgments,
such as in El-Masri K The Former Yugoslav Re -
public of Macedonia, Al-Nashiri K Poland and
Hirsi Jamaa and others K Italy cases, the ECtHR
has applied «particularly thorough scrutiny» con-
sidering that the negligent or wilful behaviour of a
State where it ought to have known of a serious
risk of ill-treatment leads to  full responsibility,
even beyond the traditional conception of State
 liability.55 In these cases, the ECtHR examined ill-
treatment falling under the scope of Article 3
ECHR. In Hirsi Jamaa and others K Italy, for in-
stance, the ECtHR’s  analysis concerned the trans-
fer of asylum seekers in international waters to
Libya. The ECtHR concluded that the Italian
 Government failed to  ensure that the person in
question would not face a real risk of being sub-
jected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR in
the event of repatriation. The ECtHR once again
referred to the prior knowledge of the au-
thorities and stated that «the Italian authorities
knew or should have known that there were in -
sufficient guarantees protecting the parties con-
cerned».56
In its examination in El-Masri, the ECtHR attached
importance to the reports and relevant
international and foreign jurisprudence.
In addition, given the specific circumstances of the
case, media articles which showed that worrying
interrogation methods had been used in Guan -
tánamo Bay and Bagram (Afghanistan) were used
as an evidence of the State’s negligent ignorance
of easily available information. Furthermore, no
assurances from the US authorities were sought to
avert of the risk of the applicant’s ill-treatment.
Thus the ECtHR ruled that the threshold for the
 establishment of State responsibility was attained
as the Italian authorities had failed to take
 reasonable steps to avoid the risk of ill-treatment
of which they knew or ought to have known.57
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The identical argumentation is present also in 
Al-Nashiri.58 At the end of October 2002, the
 applicant was captured in Dubai, in the United
Arab Emirates. By November 2002, he was trans-
ferred to the custody of the CIA. He was brought
first to a prison in Afghanistan known as Salt-Pit,
then to another CIA prison in Bangkok, Thailand,
code-named «Cat’s Eye». He was then transferred
to Poland and detained in the «black site» in Stare
Kiejkuty (from 4/5 December 2002 to 6 June
2003). During his detention, CIA agents used «En-
hanced Interrogation Techniques» on the appli-
cant. After his transfer out of Poland, he was de-
tained in Rabat, Morocco, until 22 September
2003, and was then flown to the US Naval Base in
Guantánamo Bay.
The ECtHR found that, «given that knowledge
and the emerging widespread public information
about ill-treatment and abuse of detained terrorist
suspects in the custody of the US authorities,
[Poland] ought to have known that, by enabling
the CIA to detain such persons on its territory, it
exposed them to a serious risk of treatment con-
trary to the Convention». The ECtHR described
that «the Polish State, on account of its ««ac -
quiescence and connivance» in the [High-Value
Detainees] Programme must be regarded as re-
sponsible for the violation of the applicant’s rights
under Article 3 of the Convention».59
The argumentation used in El-Masri and Al-Nashiri
is extremely relevant to the methodology of
 examining major human rights violations. It is in
fact essential to use unconventional
methods when the facts cannot be gathered
and established through official documents. The
«emerging widespread public information about
ill-treatment» was the vital link in the argu -
mentation. The authorities’ complete denial of 
the events did not prevent the ECtHR from using
other material that showed their clear knowledge
of the risk of ill-treatment and conditions of de-
tention that would violate the rights under Article
3 of the Convention. 
(f) Special set of rights within the extraterritorial
doctrine: severe environmental cases
On the basis of the current jurisprudence, con -
clusions can be drawn that the application of
 extraterritorial obligation requires a certain
level of severity which is relatively high under
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention if compared to
the rights with limitation clauses, e.g. Article 8 of
the Convention, which is more often applied in
environmental cases. Despite the high threshold,
the criteria for the application of Articles 2 and 3
of the Convention have already been met in the
environmental cases of Öneryildiz K Turkey and
Budayeva K Russia.60 Both cases concerned
deaths and serious injuries. In addition to the
severity of the harm, the passivity of the States
 despite their knowledge of the high probability of
the harm has been a determining factor.
However, Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention
might not be as far from each other in the ju-
risprudence focusing on environment as they
 usually are in other contexts. In Budayeva K
 Russia, the ECtHR stated that «in the context of
dangerous activities the scope of positive obli -
gations under Article 2 of the Convention largely
overlaps with those under Article 8».61 Pedersen
has noted that this approach was illustrated when
the ECtHR transferred Article 2 obligations on an
effective administrative and legislative framework
(Budayeva K Russia) to the Article 8 claim
(Tatar62).63 Thus it is not fully excluded that Article
8 could not meet the severity threshold in extra -
territorial context.64
In addition to the fact that the severity threshold
has already been attained in the environmental
context in non-extraterritorial cases, environmen-
tal harms often involve the circumvention of
human rights, which has been a central theme of
the extraterritorial jurisprudence under Article 3 of
the Convention.65 The responsibility could be en-
gaged if a State knowingly causes cross-border
harm or fails to control private entities conducting
extraterritorial actions. Thus, the reasoning based
on the circumvention of rights can lower the
threshold also in the environmental context.
(3) Summarising and revising the current ex-
traterritoriality criteria 
The application of extraterritoriality involves the
fulfilment of several conditions. However, these
conditions are not permanent and are subject to
modification. For example, Da Costa has noted
transformations in the extraterritorial principles 
in Issa.66 The current jurisprudence on extraterri -
toriality provides further interpretative principles
that are applicable also outside their original con-
text, when interpretation is made in accordance
with the object and purpose of the Convention
and in light of the Convention as a living instru-
ment. At the same time, certain modifications are
required when the extraterritorial doctrine is used
in environmental cases due to the special features
of the field in question. However, this observation
does not only apply to the application of general
doctrines to the environmental context, but also in
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relation to other special fields as well due to the
context specific needs.
The current jurisprudence on the extraterritoriality
criteria focuses on formalities, such as the
notion of State actors.67 However, as the positive
obligations of the States have widened over time
to include also the supervision of the acts of pri-
vate parties, the form of State actor should not be
central.68
In relation to acts of private parties, the questions
may include the following considerations. Re -
garding a State whose territory has been exploited
in environmental terms, it must be analysed,
whether national authorities have taken adequate
steps to mitigate the environmental harm. Simi -
larly, the legal question is whether, when the State
has control on the private corporation or share-
holding on the basis of the real seat theory or in-
corporation theory, it has certain obligations to
prevent the environmentally wrongful actions in
another State, when similar actions would be ille-
gal in its own territory. In these cases, rather than
focusing on the formal aspects of State actors, the
more valid question would be the division of re-
sponsibility between the States in question.69
Ilascu creates a basis for further development of
the effective control criteria.70 The steps required
in the environmental context would demand the
use of the criteria also in relation to corporations
having de facto control over the area or lives of the
people in that area. There is no particular reason,
why corporate actions, when constituting
significant control, should not be com -
parable to military occupation or de -
tention. If the Ilascu criteria are not extended,
the alternative approach is to innovatively apply
the jurisprudence on detention and similar cases
related to individuals.71
Instead of focusing too much on the current ex-
ceptional circumstances terminology, more central
issues should place emphasis on the deter-
rence of the circumvention of rights. In
the environmental context, activities are often
 carried out despite of reports warning of the
severity of the consequences. In these circum-
stances when there is intention involved, the
threshold for responsibility should be lower than
in other circumstances. This is the important logic
behind the reasoning in El-Masri.72
The comprehensive application of each criterion
as has been made in this research is not essential
for the analysis of the extraterritorial harm. For
 example, the question of whether the act is com-
mitted inside or outside the States’ border is 
not more central as the responsibility may be es-
tablished currently under both circumstances.
(4) Beyond the prevailing extraterritoriality
case-law: further considerations on the envi-
ronment
The extension of extraterritorial liability is possible
due to the doctrines of cross fertilisation of
rights and of the Convention as a living instru-
ment.73 The living instrument doctrine ensures
that the case-law is dynamic whereas the cross-
fertilisation theory impacts significantly on the
scope of protection through the dialogue be-
tween the ECtHR and the network of human
rights law.74 These doctrines empower applicants
and the ECtHR to draw inspiration from each
other by opening the «window of opportunity».75
Building analogies between different subject areas
has been typical for the current case-law of the
ECtHR. As a consequence, even when the current
cases of extraterritoriality are not based upon
 environmental harm, the doctrine of extraterri -
toriality can be transferred into new scenarios.
The scope of environmental harm having extra -
territorial dimensions is diverse. The scenario in-
cludes (a) traditional cross-border harm when the
harm is primarily caused in State X, but also has
harmful effects in State Y; (b) multinational cor -
porations cause severe environmental problems
entailing the violations of the human rights of
local communities; (c) environmental refugees,
who cannot be returned to their country of origin
due to the principle of non-refoulement; (d) en -
vironmental problems caused by collective global
pollution, such as climate change. Among these
contexts, scholars such as Alan Boyle have stated
that when a State fails to control activities within
its own territory causing environmental harm ex-
traterritorially, the victims of pollution may fall
within the jurisdiction of the polluting State under
the framework of the ECtHR.76 This proposal is in
line with the Trail Smelter Arbitration case, the sig-
nificant landmark case establishing State liability
in relation to cross-border harm.77 The case creat-
ed a basis for the polluter pays rule, according
to which the State does not have a right to use or
allow the use of its territory so that serious harm
for individuals or property will occur outside its
territory.78 This well-established development in
international environmental law provides support
for the ECtHR to explore the application of ex-
traterritoriality in the environmental context. The
Trail Smelter case has already inspired several
other tribunals.79
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However, the most legally challenging problems
on shared responsibility and extraterritorial obli -
gation include issues such as climate change.
The discourse on human rights and climate
change has started slowly, especially in regard to
the traditional treaty bodies and the human rights
courts like the ECtHR.80 The variance comes from
the number of actors contributing to the climate
change process. There are, in fact, numerous
States and other actors contributing to the
 problem rather than an identifiable individual
 culprit. This creates novel challenges for burden of
proof and causation.81
Another important aspect is the nature of rights
used in extraterritorial cases. Alan Boyle and John
Knox have analysed that the greatest potential to
create extraterritorial liability in the environmental
context would concern procedural rights. Also in
certain recent extraterritoriality cases, like Hirsi
Jamaa, the procedural guarantees are essential
and taken into account as part of the ECtHR’s
 reasoning.82
The procedural element is relevant in relation to
the case-law of absolute rights. The ECtHR has
strongly emphasised that the authorities should
take necessary steps in order to investigate any sit-
uations having led to a deprivation of the right to
life or to severe ill-treatment contrary to Article 3
of the Convention. Procedural rights have also
been central in the development of the environ-
mental jurisprudence of the ECtHR.83 Thus there is
fruitful ground to consider theoretical proba -
bilities of using procedural rights as a legal basis
for environmental extraterritoriality cases in the
ECtHR context.
The ECtHR has been encouraged to extend the
scope of rights, if the international development
supports it. The Aarhus Convention84 has been a
significant instrument on establishment of the
procedural rights within the environ-
mental law. Both Knox and Boyle have con -
sidered that Article 3(9) of the Aarhus Convention
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of «citizen-
ship, nationality or domicile» in conjunction with
the rights related to access to environmental in -
formation, participatory rights and access to court
provides an example of extraterritorial environ-
mental rights.85 Boyle has drawn conclusions that
«in substance the Aarhus Convention Rights
are also ECHR rights, enforceable in national law
and through Strasbourg Court like any other
human rights».86 Boyle also considers that Taskin
and others K Turkey is an example of the most
commonly violated set of extraterritorial rights in-
cluding equal access to information and partici -
patory rights.87 On the basis of Taskin, Knox has
further continued that the Aarhus Convention
would «require equal access to justice in environ-
mental cases generally, not just with respect to
cases concerning access to information and par-
ticipation in decision making regarding specific
projects».88
Further support for the revision of extraterri -
toriality doctrine is provided by the so-called
Maastricht Principles on extraterritoriality
 created by the International Commission of Ju-
rists. Article 9 of the Maastricht Principles includes
«situations over which State acts or omissions
bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment
of economic, social and cultural rights, whether
within or outside its territory».89 While the Maas-
tricht Principles are not legally binding, the UN
High Commissioner of Human Rights has re -
cognised the value of the instrument90 and the
document can be regarded as an illustration of the
ideas from the «invisible college of international
lawyers».91
In light of the current developments, it is not un-
likely to assume that the application of procedural
rights under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention,
inspired by the Aarhus Convention and the devel-
opments at the UN level, could be acknowledged
in future extraterritorial cases. This outcome
would be analogous to the Trail Smelter case,
where the causal link between the act and the
cross-border harm was reasonably established. In
addition, the extension of the State responsibility
would also be easier, when the act is caused by a
State actor. 
(5) Concluding remarks
The current doctrine of extraterritoriality has sev-
eral conditions that must be satisfied. However,
these conditions are subject to revision. The cur-
rent case-continuum of extraterritoriality focuses
on formal requirements, such as the notion of
State actors.92 However, as the positive obligations
of the States have been expanded and now cover
the supervision of the acts of private parties, the
notion of State actors should not be
deemed as important as it has been so
far.93 In addition, the comprehensive application
of each criterion is not necessarily central for the
analysis of the extraterritorial harm. For example,
the question of whether the act is com -
mitted inside or outside State’s borders 
is not fundamental and the responsibility 
may be established under both circum-
stances.
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International developments, such as the Maas-
tricht Principles, support the stretching
of current extraterritorial case-law into
new fields, including environment law. At the
same time the application of procedural rights in
the context of ECtHR environmental extraterritori-
al issues may provide inspiration for future de -
velopments and the use of procedural rights also
in other contexts. Together with the object and
purpose oriented approach focusing on the
prevention of circumvention of treaty obligations,
these doctrines make convincing arguments for
reforming the established extraterritorial doctrine.
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